

Assumption-based argumentation for epistemic and practical reasoning

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Motivation

Assumption-based argumentation can
serve as an effective

computational tool

for argumentation-based reasoning (e.g.
legal epistemic and practical reasoning)

Outline


- Abstract argumentation [Dung95]
- Assumption-based argumentation [Bondarenko, Dung, Kowalski, Toni 97]
- Epistemic reasoning example
- Practical reasoning example
- Conclusions

Abstract Argumentation

- Abstract argumentation framework:
(arguments, attacks)
- Various ways to sanction when a set of arguments is “OK”, e.g.
 - a set of arguments is *admissible* iff
 - it does not attack itself and
 - it attacks every argument that attacks it (i.e. it “defends” itself against all attacks)

Abstract argumentation example

arguments: $\alpha; \beta; \gamma; \delta$

attacks: 

- $\{\}, \{\beta\}, \{\beta, \delta\}, \{\beta, \gamma\}$ admissible

Abstract Argumentation (cntd)

Other notions of “being OK” (semantics) exist:
a set of arguments is

- *preferred* iff
 - it is maximally admissible
- *complete* iff
 - it is admissible and it contains all arguments it defends
- *grounded* iff
 - it is minimally complete
- *ideal* iff
 - it is admissible, and
 - it is a subset of every preferred set of arguments

Abstract Argumentation (cntd)

Notions of sets of arguments “being OK” lift up to notions of sentences (beliefs/properties) “being OK”: e.g.


- A sentence is admissible iff
 - *it is supported** by an argument contained in an admissible set of arguments

*requires framework with *(arguments, attacks, support)*

Notes on semantics

- Semantics differ in their level of scepticism, with boundaries:
 - Preferred (the most credulous)
 - Grounded (the most sceptical)

- Example: arguments: $\alpha; \beta; \gamma; \delta$




- $\{\}$ grounded
- $\{\beta, \delta\}$ and $\{\beta, \gamma\}$ preferred
- $\{\beta\}$ sceptical preferred (intersection of all preferred) and ideal

Notes on semantics (cntd)

- Semantics differ in their level of scepticism, with boundaries:
 - Preferred (the most credulous)
 - Grounded (the most sceptical)

- Another example: arguments: $\alpha; \beta; \gamma; \delta; \varepsilon; \phi$
attacks:



- $\{\beta, \delta, \phi\}$ and $\{\beta, \gamma, \phi\}$ preferred
- $\{\beta, \phi\}$ sceptical preferred
- $\{\beta\}$ and ideal

Assumption-based argumentation

- Recall abstract argumentation framework:
(arguments, attacks)
- In assumption-based argumentation frameworks:
 - *arguments* defined in terms of:
 - a **deductive system** (also defining *support*)
 - a set of candidate **assumptions**
 - *attacks* defined in terms of:
 - a notion of **contrary** of assumption

Assumption-based argumentation formally

- An assumption-based argumentation framework is $(\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{R}, A, \bar{\cdot})$ where
 - $(\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{R})$ is a deductive system
 - \mathcal{L} set of sentences
 - \mathcal{R} set of inference rules $s \leftarrow s_1, \dots, s_n$
 - $A \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ is a set of candidate assumptions
 - \bar{a} is the contrary of assumption a

From assumption-based to abstract argumentation

- Given an assumption-based argumentation framework
 - arguments are *tight* deductions supported by sets of assumptions
 - an argument α attacks* another argument β if the conclusion of α is the contrary of one of the assumptions supporting β

*undermining attack – but rebuttal attack can be obtained too – [Dung, Kowalski, Toni 06] and later example

Assumption-based argumentation: example

$(\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{R}, A, \bar{\cdot})$:

- $\mathcal{L} = \{a, b, c, d, \neg a, \neg b, \neg c, \neg d\}$
- $\mathcal{R} = \{\neg a \leftarrow a, \neg a \leftarrow b, \neg b \leftarrow a, \neg c \leftarrow d, \neg d \leftarrow c\}$
- $A = \{a, b, c, d\}$
- $\bar{a} = \neg a; \bar{b} = \neg b; \bar{c} = \neg c; \bar{d} = \neg d$

$a \vdash \neg a$ attacks itself

$b \vdash \neg a$ attacks $a \vdash \neg b$, etc

- $\{\}$ grounded
- $\{b, d\}$ and $\{b, c\}$ preferred
- $\{b\}$ sceptical preferred and ideal

$\{a\}$ attacks itself

$\{b\}$ attacks $\{a\}$

Computational counterpart for assumption-based argumentation

- Dispute derivations (between a proponent and an opponent) for computing
 - admissible sets of assumptions (AB-dispute derivations)
 - grounded sets of assumptions (GB-dispute derivations)
 - ideal sets of assumptions (IB-dispute derivations, using Fail-dispute derivations)
- Prolog implementation (CaSAPI)

AB-Dispute derivations

- $\mathcal{R} = \{\neg a \leftarrow a, \neg a \leftarrow b, \neg b \leftarrow a, \neg c \leftarrow d, \neg d \leftarrow c\}$
- $\bar{a} = \neg a; \bar{b} = \neg b; \bar{c} = \neg c; \bar{d} = \neg d$

Is $\neg a$ an admissible belief?

Proponent	Opponent	Assumptions supporting Proponent	Culprits chosen in Opponent
$\{\neg a\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$
$\{b\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\{\neg b\}\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\{a\}\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\neg a\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a\}$

GB-Dispute derivations

- $\mathcal{R} = \{\neg a \leftarrow a, \neg a \leftarrow b, \neg b \leftarrow a, \neg c \leftarrow d, \neg d \leftarrow c\}$
- $\bar{a} = \neg a; \bar{b} = \neg b; \bar{c} = \neg c$

Is $\neg a$ a grounded belief?

Proponent	Opponent	Assumptions supporting Proponent	Culprits chosen in Opponent
$\{\neg a\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$
$\{b\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\{\neg b\}\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\{a\}\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\neg a\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a\}$
.....			

IS-Dispute derivations

- $\mathcal{R} = \{\neg a \leftarrow a, \neg a \leftarrow b, \neg b \leftarrow a, \neg c \leftarrow d, \neg d \leftarrow c\}$

Is $\neg a$ an ideal belief?

Proponent	Opponent	Assumptions of Proponent	Culprits in Opponent	Sentences to Fail upon
$\{\neg a\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$
$\{b\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\{\neg b\}\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\{a\}\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{\}$	$\{\}$
$\{\neg a\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{\{a\}\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{\{a\}\}$
$\{\}$	$\{\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{\}$ (since $\text{Fail}(\{a\})$)

Fail-dispute derivations

- $\mathcal{R} = \{\neg a \leftarrow a, \neg a \leftarrow b, \neg b \leftarrow a, \neg c \leftarrow d, \neg d \leftarrow c\}$

Fail({a})?

Proponent	Opponent	Assumptions of Proponent	Culprits in Opponent
{a}	{}	{a}	{}
{}	{¬a}	{a}	{}
{}	{{a},{b}}	{a}	{}
{}	{{},{b}}	{a}	{}

Epistemic reasoning: example

Example from [Prakken, Sartor 96]

- **Defeasible rules:**

- $r1(X)$: X 's exterior may not be modified if X is a protected building.
- $r2(X)$: X's exterior may be modified if X needs restructuring.
- $r3(X,Y)$: $R1(X) > R2(Y)$ if $R1(X)$ concerns artistic bldgs and $R2(Y)$ concerns town planning
- $t(X,Y)$: $R1(X) > R2(Y)$ if $R1(X)$ is later than $R2(Y)$

- **Strict rules:**

- $r1(X)$ concerns artistic buildings; $r2(X)$ concerns town planning
- $r2(X)$ is later than $r1(X)$; $r3(X,Y)$ is later than $t(X,Y)$
- villa is a protected building and needs restructuring

- **What should be believed about modifying villa's exterior?**

Assumption-based argumentation for epistemic reasoning

In assumption-based argumentation
(see [Kowalski, Toni 96] – but other translations possible)

- Rules \mathcal{R} :

villa 's exterior may not be modified \leftarrow *not defeated*(*r1(villa)*)

villa's exterior may be modified \leftarrow *not defeated*(*r2(villa)*)

defeated(*r1(villa)*) \leftarrow *not defeated*(*t(villa,villa)*), *not defeated*(*r2(villa)*)

defeated(*r2(villa)*) \leftarrow *not defeated*(*r3(villa,villa)*),
not defeated(*r1(villa)*)

defeated(*t(villa,villa)*) \leftarrow *not defeated*(*t(villa,villa)*),
not defeated(*r3(villa,villa)*)

- Assumptions A are *not defeated*(X), with contrary *defeated*(X).

AB-dispute derivations: *villa's exterior may not be modified*

Practical reasoning: example

Example from [Bench-Capon, Prakken 06]

- Possible decisions: *prison; fine; (community) service*
- Beliefs:
 - punish \leftarrow prison
 - punish \leftarrow fine
 - punish \leftarrow service
 - deter \leftarrow prison
 - deter \leftarrow fine
 - \neg deter \leftarrow service
 - rehabilitate \leftarrow service
 - \neg rehabilitate \leftarrow prison
 - protect \leftarrow prison
- Which decision,
given goals: punish, deter, rehabilitate (in some order)?


Assumption-based argumentation for practical reasoning

- $A = \{prison; fine; service, a, b, c, d\}$
- $contrary(prison) = \{fine, service\}$ $contrary(fine) = \{prison; service\}$
 $contrary(service) = \{prison; fine\}$
 $contrary(a) = \neg deter$ $contrary(b) = deter$
 $contrary(c) = \neg rehabilitate$ $contrary(d) = rehabilitate$
- \mathcal{R} consists of
 $punish \leftarrow prison$
 $punish \leftarrow fine$
 $punish \leftarrow service$
 $deter \leftarrow prison, a$
 $deter \leftarrow fine, a$
 $\neg deter \leftarrow service, b$
 $rehabilitate \leftarrow service, c$
 $\neg rehabilitate \leftarrow prison, d$
 $protect \leftarrow prison$
- AB-dispute derivations: given goals $punish \& deter$, decision is $prison$

Conclusions

- In ARGUGRID: decisions/beliefs are about composing services over the grid for e-business applications (see later overview)
- Related work: Bench-Capon&Prakken, Prakken at COMMA 2006, Amgoud05 and more
- Ongoing work:
 - Refinement of the implementation
 - automated translation into assumption-based argumentation
 - generalised notion of contrary in assumption-based argumentation
 - preferences on goals/properties for practical reasoning
- Extensions:
 - uncertainty on events in the world
 - quantitative utilities assigned to goals

Overview of ARGUGRID www.argugrid.eu



Goals

- Develop argumentation-based foundations for the GRID, populated by rational decision-making agents within virtual organisations.
- Incorporate argumentation models into service-centric architecture.
- Develop underlying platform using P2P computing and overlay networks.
- Validate ArguGRID by way of industrial application scenarios.